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We develop a simple yet realistic model of income insurance, where the individual’s ability 
and willingness to work is treated as a continuous variable. In this framework, income 
insurance not only provides income smoothing, it also relieves the individual from 
particularly burdensome work. As a result, the individual adjusts his labor supply in a 
continuous fashion to the implicit tax wedge of the insurance system. Moral hazard, in the 
sense that an individual receives insurance benefits without actually being fully qualified, also 
becomes a matter of degree. Moreover, our continuous framework makes it easy to analyze 
both the role of administrative rejection of claims, and the role of social norms, for the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The modern literature on income insurance originates mainly from the seminal work of 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), who develop models where 
an individual suffers an income loss due to an exogenous, binary event. This event may be 
interpreted as a health shock, which can take one of two values: the individual is either able to 
work (healthy) or unable to do so (sick), where the latter state implies that the individual will 
necessarily be absent from work.
1 It is, however, more realistic to treat health as a matter of 
degree. For instance, Cochrane (1972) has emphasized that health is usually a continuous 
variable that cannot realistically be depicted in terms of two alternative states (sick and 
healthy). Moreover, an individual’s absence from work may depend on other factors which 
are not purely medical, but which should realistically also be regarded in terms of degree. 
Examples include attitudes towards work, leisure, and social interaction at the workplace, as 
well as aspects of the individual’s private life that may influence his ability and willingness to 
work (such as conflicts within the family).  
 
Against this background, we model the individual’s ability and willingness to work as a 
stochastic variable with a continuous distribution. This allows for a more comprehensive 
analysis of income insurance than the traditional approach based on a binary distribution of 
the individual’s state of health.
  This may seem like a minor technical change in the model. 
However, the continuous approach substantially alters the character of insurance. In the 
binary model, the purpose of insurance is only to smooth income across two different states of 
health: when unable to work, the individual is (more or less) compensated for his income loss. 
In our approach, the purpose of insurance is both to smooth income and to make it feasible for 
the individual to stay home when work is particularly burdensome. For a given realization of 
the health variable, the individual has a choice of whether to go to work or to apply for 
benefits, and his actual choice depends on the generosity of the insurance system.  
                                                 
1 In the Diamond-Mirrlees tradition, Whinston (1983) has analyzed the case with ex ante heterogeneous agents, 
and Gosolov and Tsyvinski (2006) have elaborated on the multi-period aspects of the model. The Rothschild-
Stiglitz approach (as well as that of Wilson, 1977), can also be interpreted as dealing with binary stochastic 
health shocks. However, instead of studying a government insurance monopoly, these authors highlight the 
functioning, and weaknesses, of competitive insurance markets when individuals are heterogeneous (ex ante and 
not just ex post) in terms of risk. Prescott and Townsend (1984) also study a binary health shock; they show that 
with a representative agent, the social optimum can be achieved as the outcome of a decentralized, competitive 
market. (See Rees, 1989, Rees and Wambach, 2008, and Zweifel, 2007, for more recent expositions of the 
traditional binary approach in insurance theory.). 
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In addition to its realism, our approach has other advantages. It allows us to take 
administrative rejection of benefit claims into account in a coherent way. It is also well suited 
for analyzing the role of social norms in terms of the functioning of income insurance. 
Generally speaking, our approach enables us to capture a number of real-world phenomena 
within a simple analytical framework. The model is particularly suited for the analysis of 
temporary and permanent disability insurance, but after appropriate modifications also of 
other arrangements of income insurance. 
 
 
2.  The Individual 
 
To build an insurance theory that accommodates a continuous approach to an individual’s 
ability and willingness to work, we write utility as a linearly separable function of 
consumption c and labor supplyl:  () uu c θ = +⋅ l, where θ  is a taste parameter that may be 
negative as well as positive. We apply the standard assumptions  0 ) ( ' > ⋅ u  and  .
 We 
also assume that   can take only the values 0 and 1. Thus utility when working is 
0 ) ( ' ' < ⋅ u
l
()
W uu c θ =+ , while utility when absent from work is  . (
A u ) c u =
2 Hence we assume that the 
consumption utility is the same regardless of whether the individual goes to work or not. The 
basic reason is that we want to avoid distractions from our ambition to investigate the 
consequences of a continuous treatment of θ. Moreover, it is not clear whether the marginal 
utility of consumption should be assumed to be increasing or decreasing in θ . As we proceed, 
the implications of dropping the assumption of separability will be discussed in several 
footnotes. 
 
The parameter θ  is drawn from an arbitrary probability distribution;
3 it takes negative values 
when the individual experiences disutility from work and positive values when he enjoys 
work per se. While in the traditional labor supply literature it is usually assumed that the 
                                                 
2 There is a literature on absence from work that uses a utility function with a continuous index variable 
reflecting the individual’s health status; see, for instance, Barmby et al. (1994) and the survey by Brown and 
Sessions (1996). However, this literature deals with efficiency wages rather than insurance theory. By contrast, 
Diamond and Sheshinski (1995), when studying the possibility of supplementing old-age pensions with 
disability pensions, assume a utility function with a continuous health parameter in an optimal insurance setting. 
3 Although we treat θ  as a continuous variable in this paper, our formal analysis also covers the case when the 
distribution of θ  is discrete.   3
individual always experiences disutility from work as compared to leisure (i. e., in the context 
of our framework θ < 0) this is an unnecessarily narrow view. It is more realistic to assume 




While we treat θ as a continuous variable, we follow the tradition in much of the income 
insurance literature and regard the choice between work and leisure as binary: the individual 
either works or stays home. Such a treatment of labor supply at the extensive margin not only 
simplifies the exposition; it is also highly relevant when studying income insurance, which 
mainly pays benefits to individuals who do not work at all. However, it is straightforward to 
extend the analysis to part-time work and part-time benefits. 
 
The case without insurance is a useful starting point for our analysis. The individual’s utility 
may now be written   when working, with the wage rate normalized to unity. 
Similarly, utility is   when absent from work.
θ + = ) 1 ( u u
W
) 0 ( u u
A =
W u =
5 Here, the “zero” does not necessarily 
mean that the individual is subject to starvation when not working. He may have other 
resources than labor income to support himself; these are suppressed in the notation  . The 
cut-off point, at which he is indifferent between work and non-work in a world without 




  .     (1)  ) 1 ( ) 0 ( 0 u u − ≡
∗ θ
 
The individual stays home for all realizations  , and he goes to work otherwise.
∗ ≤ 0 θ θ
6  
 
Let us now introduce insurance into the model. We confine our discussion to a simple type of 
insurance that schematically reflects income insurance in the real world. More specifically, 
                                                 
4 An alternative to a stochastic taste parameter in the utility function would be a stochastic productivity 
parameter, expressing the relation between the individual’s effort and output (cf. Albanesi and Sleet, 2006). 
5 The stochastic variable θ  expresses the discomfort of going to work rather than staying home. Alternatively, 
we could have introduced two separate stochastic parameters in the utility function:   and 
, respectively. With additive separability, our variable 
1 ) 1 ( θ + = u u
W
2 ) 0 ( θ + = u u
A θ  could then be interpreted as  2 1 θ θ − . 
6 With a general utility function  ) , ( θ c u
) , (
, the cut-off corresponding to equation (1) is given by 
. Provided  ) 0 , 0 ( ) , 1 ( 0 u u =
∗ θ θ c u  is monotone in both arguments, the solution   is unique. 
∗
0 θ  4
we represent an insurance contract by the triplet  , where p is the premium paid by the 
individual, b is the benefit, and   is the insurer’s cut-off, i.e., the value of 
) ˆ , , ( θ b p
θ ˆ θ  below which the 
insurer is willing to pay a benefit when the individual does not work. (We use a hat (^) to 
denote cut-offs that are set by the insurer, and a star (*) for cut-offs chosen by the individual.) 
Such a contract permits the individual to enjoy utility  when working. If his 
realization of 
θ + − = ) 1 ( p u u
W
θ  is smaller than or equal to the cut-off   specified in the contract, he may 
instead stay home and enjoy utility  . We assume that the stochastic taste parameter 
θ ˆ
) (b u u
A =
θ  is drawn from a general probability distribution  ) (θ F  with density  ) (θ f . The probability 
that the individual will live on benefit now is  
 
  .   ) ˆ ( ) ˆ Pr( θ θ θ π F ≡ ≤ ≡
 
We interpret the model as describing the behavior of a large number of ex ante identical 
individuals, with i. i. d. stochastic taste parameters θ  drawn from the distribution  ) (θ F . With 
this interpretation, individuals differ ex post, i.e., after realization of the stochastic taste 
parameters, and the variable   denotes the total absence rate in society. The reason 
for assuming ex ante identical individuals is that we want to study issues related to ex post 
moral hazard, rather than problems of adverse selection and cream-skimming, as thoroughly 
analyzed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
) ˆ (θ π F ≡
7  
 
Whether the insurer can observe the individual realization of θ  or not is crucial for the 
functioning of insurance contracts. We therefore organize the subsequent analysis along the 
dimension of the insurer’s ability to observe  θ , starting with the polar cases when  θ  is 
either fully observable or entirely non-observable. Subsequently, we consider the more 





                                                 
7 In an earlier version of this paper (Lindbeck and Persson, 2006) we allowed for ex ante different individuals; 
the difficulties of establishing pooling and separating equilibria in a competitive market were similar to those of 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).    5
3.  Market Equilibrium Under Full Observability 
 
When the realization of  θ  is fully observable, we could conceive of very elaborate insurance 
contracts. For instance, both the premium p and the benefit b could be made contingent on the 
realization of  θ . Such a contract may then state that if  θ  takes a particular value  i θ , the 
individual pays an amount  , while if  i p θ  takes a value  j θ , the individual receives an 
amount   – regardless of whether he works or not at that particular realization of  j b θ . 
However, we are not going to study contracts of this general type. The reason is that the only 
purpose of the present section (on full observability of  θ ) is to provide a benchmark for the 
subsequent analysis, which deals with more realistic types of contracts. We therefore confine 
the analysis in this section to insurance contracts for which the triplet   is independent 
of each individual’s realization of
) ˆ , , ( θ b p
θ , and where the individual pays a premium only when 
working, and where benefits are received when not working. It can be shown that individuals 
in this framework will either support themselves from labor earnings or live on benefits. We 
thus have the following lemma, which turns out to be useful in the subsequent analysis:  
 
Lemma 1: Under full observability, an optimal contract   implies that no one will 
choose to stay home without benefits. 
) ˆ , , ( F F F b p θ
 
Proof: See Appendix 1.  
 
Due to this Lemma, the expression for the individual’s expected utility has only two terms: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ) ˆ ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ ( 1 ) ( ) ˆ ( θ θ θ θ θ > + − ⋅ − + ⋅ ≡ E p u F b u F EU ,   (2) 
 
where the first term represents the utility of those who stay home with benefit b and the 
second term the utility of those who work and earn a net wage 1 – p. An optimal contract 
maximizes the expected utility with respect to  , subject to the insurer’s budget 
constraint 
) ˆ , , ( θ b p
 
  ( ) 0 ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 1 = ⋅ − ⋅ − b F p F θ θ ,   (3)   6
 
and the non-negativity constraints 
 
 0  and  .     (4)  ≥ p 0 ≥ b
 
The Lagrangean is 
 
() ( )
() [] b p b F p F
E p u F b u F L
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ +
+ > + − ⋅ − + ⋅ ≡
ν μ θ θ λ
θ θ θ θ θ
) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 1
) ˆ ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ ( 1 ) ( ) ˆ (
   (5) 
 
with the first-order conditions 
 
     w. r. t. p:      ( ) ( ) 0 ) ˆ ( 1 ) 1 ( ' ) ˆ ( 1 = + − ⋅ + − ⋅ − − μ θ λ θ F p u F , (6) 
     w. r. t. b:      ,     (7)  0 ) ˆ ( ) ( ' ) ˆ ( = + ⋅ − ⋅ ν θ λ θ F b u F
     w. r. t.  :      .     (8)  θ ˆ 0 ) ( ˆ ) 1 ( ) ( = + ⋅ − − − − b p p u b u λ θ
 
From these three conditions, we can derive a number of properties of an optimal insurance 
system when θ  is fully observable by the insurer. Some of the properties are wellknown from 
the traditional (binary) insurance literature. The most obvious example is that if insurance is 
desirable at all, full insurance is optimal (abstracting from administrative costs).
8 The 
intuition is that if an individual’s health status is fully observable, moral hazard in the sense 
that people misrepresent their health condition (θ ) cannot emerge. An insurance that permits 
full income smoothing is therefore optimal – as in the traditional, binary insurance models 
(provided the health variable enters additively in the utility function).
 9 
                                                
 
 
8 Proof: With an interior solution  , the multipliers associated with the non-negativity 
constraints (4) are zero, and thus (6) and (7) can be written as 
0 , 0 > > F F b p
λ = − ) 1 ( ' p u  and  λ = ) ( ' b u , respectively. We 
therefore have  ) ( ' ) 1 ( ' b u p u = − , which implies that 1 – p = b.   Q. E. D. 
9 With a non-separable utility function  ) , ( θ c u , full insurance is generally not optimal. The expression 
corresponding to   then is  ) ( ' ) 1 ( ' b u p u = − ) 0 , ( ) ˆ ) , 1 ( ( E 1 1 b u p u = > − θ θ θ . This expression has a 
simple intuitive interpretation: the expected marginal utility of income should be the same across the two states 
of working and not working. It can be satisfied for full, less-than-full and overfull insurance, depending on the 
cross derivative   and the distribution of  12 u θ .   7
An attractive property of our model is that it allows a simple explicit solution for the optimal 
contract  . From (6)-(8) and the budget constraint (3), we obtain  ) ˆ , , ( F F F b p θ
 
 ) ,       ( 9 a )   ˆ ( F F F p θ =
 ) ,     (9b)  ˆ ( 1 F F F b θ − =
( ) ) ˆ ( 1 ' ˆ
F F F u θ θ − − = .     (9c) 
 
This system is recursive. Since the right-hand side of (9c) is monotonically decreasing in  , 
it has a unique solution. Inserting this solution into (9a) and (9b), we obtain closed-form 
expressions for   and  . 
F θ ˆ
F p F b
 
Such a contract maximizes the individual’s expected utility ex ante, hence before a specific θ  
has been realized. However, after the realization of θ , the individual might want to stay home 
and receive benefits even for some realizations of θ  above  . Indeed, the individual’s 
subjective cut-off   in the case of insurance is the point at which he is indifferent between 




  .     (10)  ) 1 ( ) ( p u b u − − ≡
∗ θ
 
Since full insurance ( ) is optimal under full observability, we conclude that 
. Hence, individuals would like to stay home and receive benefits 
for all negative realizations of 
F F p b − =1
0 ) ≡ 1 ( ) ( − − ≡
∗
F F F p u b u θ
θ . However, since θ  is fully observable, they will, in fact, 




Some properties of the optimal insurance contract are illustrated in Figure 1. Since  ,  
only a fraction of those who would like to stay home and live on benefits are actually allowed 
to do so (i.e., those for whom  ).
∗ < F F θ θ ˆ
F θ θ ˆ ≤
10  
 
                                                 
10 Proof that  :   by (9c). With full insurance,   by (10). Thus  . 
∗ < F F θ θ ˆ 0 ˆ < F θ 0 =
∗
F θ
∗ < F F θ θ ˆ  8
 (Figure  1) 
 
In general, insurance in a model with a continuous taste parameter achieves two goals: income 
smoothing and relief from particularly burdensome work. The cost is a loss in average 
production and hence consumption. While with an additively separable utility function 
(, ) () uc uc θ θ =+  the first goal is driven to its extreme in the sense that complete income 
smoothing (full insurance) is optimal,
11 there is a trade-off between the second goal (relief 
from burdensome work) and average consumption. We state this insight by the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: With additive separability, hence  ( , ) ( ) uc uc θ θ = + , optimal insurance implies 
a trade-off between relief from particularly burdensome work, on the one hand, and average 
consumption on the other hand.  
 
Proof: By Lemma 1, 
∗∗ >θ θF ˆ
0 (0) (1 ) (0) (1) uu p uuθ
∗ ≡− − >−≡ . Thus   in the case of 
a continuous distribution of 
∗ > 0 ˆ θ θF
θ , which means that the individual will be absent more often with 
insurance than without.  Q. E. D. 
 
As we would expect, insurance thus makes the individual choosier when deciding whether to 
work or not, and the insurer also allows him to stay home (with benefit) more often. There is a 




So far, we have discussed a number of properties of an optimal insurance system, provided 
insurance is desirable in the first place. The next question is whether insurance actually is 
desirable. In traditional analysis, insurance is always desirable if the utility function is 
concave (abstracting from administrative costs). It turns out that our model has stricter 
conditions for insurance to be desirable. To see this we define the lower and upper support of 
the distribution of θ : 
                                                 
11 As pointed out in footnote 9, this property depends on the assumption of additive separability. In the case of a 
non-separable utility function  , insurance implies a simultaneous trade-off between income smoothing 
and pain relief on one hand, and consumption on the other hand. 
(,) ucl
12 The size of the loss in production would be expected to depend on how much the individual’s productivity is 
harmed by negative outcomes of  θ  - an issue that we do not model.   9
 
). 0 ) ( 1 sup(











We then have 
 
Proposition 2: Assuming a concave consumption utility function, and abstracting from 
administrative costs, insurance is desirable under full observability if and only if the 
distribution of  θ  is such that (i)   and (ii) 
∗ ≡ − > 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( θ θ u u upper ) 1 ( ' u lower − < θ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
 
Whether insurance is desirable or not under full observability thus depends on whether the 
distribution of  θ  has positive density (i) above  ) 1 ( ) 0 ( u u −  and (ii) below  , where 
 by concavity. Proposition (2) can be equivalently phrased in the following 
way: Insurance is never desirable if either 
) 1 ( ' u −
) ) 1 ( ) 0 ( u u − < − 1 ( ' u
) 1 ( ) 0 ( u u upper − < θ  or  ) 1 ( ' u lower − > θ , regardless of 
whether consumption utility is concave or not. The intuition is straightforward for our non-
traditional conclusion that concavity of the consumption utility function is not sufficient for 
insurance to be desirable. Condition (i) says that insurance can be financed only if  θ  can t
sufficiently high values for the individual to be willing to work (and pay an insurance 
premium) at least some time. Condition (ii) says that it is worthwhile to pay an insurance 
premium, and hence to abstain from some consumption, only if 
ake 
θ  can take sufficiently 
negative values. Intuitively speaking, insurance is desirable only if the reduction in pain from 
burdensome work ( θ ) more than compensates for the reduced consumption when paying a 
premium with the utility cost  .  ) 1 ( ' u
 
A graphical representation of the optimal interior solution ( ) may be 
instructive. First, the insurer’s budget constraint (3) can be written 











) ˆ ( 1
θ
θ
,     (11) 
   10
depicted by the straight line OF in Figure 2 for a given cut-off  .  F θ ˆ
 
 (Figure  2) 
 




) 1 ( '
) ˆ (
















.     (12) 
 
Clearly, the curve is upward-sloping and convex, as illustrated by the indifference curves in 
Figure 2. The obvious intuition is that the individual is willing to pay a higher premium only 
if he receives a higher benefit. Moreover, the required benefit increases progressively. 
Assuming that the conditions in Proposition 2 are satisfied, the optimal insurance contract is 
represented by point F in the figure, located on the “full insurance line” b = 1 – p.  
 
In conclusion, income insurance provides two advantages: income smoothing and “pain 
avoidance”. The latter, which is not dealt with in the traditional literature, means that the 
individual can afford to stay home from work during periods when working is particularly 
painful (formally, when  ). The cost of enjoying these two benefits is a reduction in 
average production and hence consumption, as compared to the case with no insurance.  








4. Market Equilibrium Under Non-Observability 
 
We now turn to the opposite extreme, where the realization of the taste parameter is 
completely non-observable for the insurer. In this case, the insurer’s cut-off in the triplet 
 must be incentive compatible, i.e.,   ) ˆ , , ( θ b p
   11
ˆ () ( 1 ) ub u p θθ
∗ == −−.       (13) 
 
The reason why the contract has to be incentive-compatible is straightforward. If  , the 
individual would have an incentive to misrepresent his realization of 
θ θ ˆ >
∗
θ , hence mimicking 
individuals with low realizations. If instead  , the latter would be irrelevant for the 
individual’s behaviour. In principle, our restriction (13) corresponds to the “moral hazard 
constraint” in Diamond and Mirrlees (1978).




From (13) we immediately see that   for all  . In other words, Proposition 1 
holds also when 
∗ ∗ > 0 θ θ 0 , 0 > > b p
θ  is not observable. Introducing insurance will necessarily impose a cost in 
the form of lower aggregate labor supply and production. Optimal insurance will trade off  
this loss against the gain in terms of income smoothing and relief from burdensome work 
(pain avoidance).  
 
The optimal insurance contract under non-observability is obtained by maximizing expected 
utility (2) subject to both the budget constraint (3) and the incentive-compatibility constraint 
(13). As a result, expected utility in the optimal contract is lower than (or, as a special case, 
the same as) under full observability:  F N EU EU ≤ . The first-order conditions with respect to 
p and b are (after some rearranging)
14  
 
       w. r. t. p:  ( ) ( ) μ λ θ λ θ − − − ⋅ − = + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ −
∗ ∗ ) 1 ( ' ) ( 1 ) ( ) 1 ( ' ) ( p u F b p p u f , (14) 
       w. r. t. b:  ( ) ν λ θ λ θ − − ⋅ = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
∗ ∗ ) ( ' ) ( ) ( ) ( ' ) ( b u F b p b u f ,   (15) 
 
where   is shorthand for 
∗ θ ) 1 ( ) ( p u b u − − . It can be shown that, just as in traditional theory of 
income insurance, less than full insurance is optimal under non-observability: 
(see Appendix 3 for proof). However, our model also generates some new insights. For 
instance, we have 
N N p b − <1 
 
                                                 
13 We may alternatively write the same contract as a duplet (p, b) and drop the incentive-compatibility constraint 
(13), replacing   in equations (2) and (3) by  .  θ ˆ ∗ θ
14 Here we have substituted (13) into (2) and (3), instead of entering equation (13) as a separate constraint.   12
Proposition 3: Assuming a concave consumption utility function, and abstracting from 
administrative costs,  
(i) a necessary condition for insurance to be desirable under non-observability is that 
; 
∗ ≡ − > 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( θ θ u u upper
(ii) given (i), a sufficient condition for insurance to be desirable under non-observability is 
that  . 
∗ ≡ − < 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( θ θ u u lower
 
Proof: See Appendix 4. 
 
Thus, while both Proposition 3 and Proposition 2 convey the same basic message, namely that 
concavity is not sufficient for insurance to be desirable, they differ in other respects.
 15 
Conditions (i) are identical in the two Propositions, but conditions (ii) imply different critical 
values for  lower θ . Morever, the two Propositions differ as to whether the conditions are 
necessary or sufficient. 
 
In Section 3 we pointed out that the consequences for labor supply differ between the binary 
and the continuous models in the case when  θ  is fully observable: introducing optimal 
insurance will never cause a fall in labor supply in the binary model, but may cause such a fall 
in our model. These properties carry over to the non-observability case when individuals are 
identical ex ante:  
 
Proposition 4:  
      Assume that insurance is desirable by Proposition 3, i.e., that  . It then   upper lower θ θ θ < <
∗
0
      holds that 
(i) if the distribution function  ) (θ F  is such that  θ  can take only two values, ) ( 1 lower θ θ =  
and ) ( 2 upper θ θ = , the introduction of optimal insurance will not cause any production 
loss. 
                                                 
15 Why, then, is concavity sufficient for insurance to be desirable in the Diamond-Mirrlees binary model? The 
reason is simply that in such a model, the individual can only experience two health states: 12 θ θ <  . 
Furthermore,  1 θ  has to be so negative that the individual is simply unable to work, which means that  10 θ θ
∗ <  
(as a special case,  −∞ → 1 θ ). Thus the conditions in Proposition 3 are, in fact, automatically satisfied in the 
binary model, and insurance will always be desired provided u(c) is concave.   13
(ii) By contrast, if the distribution  ) (θ F  is continuous and connected, the introduction of 




(i) If insurance is warranted by Proposition 3, it must be incentive-compatible. This means 
that there is no production loss: people work when  2 θ θ =  and stay home when  1 θ θ = , 
regardless of whether there is insurance or not.  Q. E. D. 
(ii) In the case of a distribution that is continuous and connected the optimal cut-off with 
insurance is  . By definition, this is larger than   for all 
. Thus, the introduction of insurance will always cause a production loss in this 
case.  Q. E. D. 
) 1 ( ) ( N N N p u b u − − ≡
∗ θ ) 1 ( ) 0 ( 0 u u − ≡
∗ θ
0 , > N N b p
 
The main differences between our approach and the traditional binary approach to income 
insurance may be summarized as follows. As a result of our treatment of the individual’s 
willingness and ability to work as a continuous stochastic variable, θ , the introduction of 
income insurance induces the individual to reduce his labor supply. The reason is the 
emergence of an implicit tax wedge, which is the sum of the insurance premium and the 
benefit rate, hence p + b.
17 (Indeed, this incentive effect also emerges if the realization of θ  is 
fully observable for the insurer.)  
 
By contrast, in the static version of the Diamond-Mirrlees’ model, where individuals (as in 
our model) are ex ante identical, labor supply is unaffected by the introduction of optimal 
insurance. The explanation is that the “moral hazard constraint”, which is basically an 
incentive-compatibility constraint, will bind in the case of an optimal social-insurance 
contract: sick individuals cannot work under any circumstances, and the optimal insurance 
arrangement implies that healthy individuals will not gain anything by pretending to be unable 
to work. Indeed, in a binary model with ex ante identical individuals, aggregate labor supply 
                                                 
16 While (ii) holds for all continuous and connected distributions, it is easy to show that an optimal insurance 
contract may cause production losses  also in the case of discrete distributions, if there are more than two 





17 The implicit tax wedge may be derived from the difference in disposable labor earnings and social-insurance 
benefits:  [ ] (1 ) 1 ( ) wt p w b w t p b −− − = − + + , where w is labor income, t the tax rate for labor income 
(outside the social insurance system), p the compulsory insurance fee and b the (after-tax) replacement rate. 
While the implicit tax wedge in the insurance system is p + b, the total tax wedge is t + p + b. For many 
European countries, realistic figures are t=0.25, p=0.10, and b=0.5, which altogether add up to 0.85.   14
will in optimum always be determined by the number of individuals who are objectively able 
to work.  
 
In Whinston’s (1983) disaggregated version of the Diamond-Mirrlees model, with a number 
of ex ante different “types” of individuals, a utilitarian optimum requires redistributions of 
income in favour of types of individuals with particularly large probabilities of becoming sick 
(unable to work). In this disaggregated framework, it may (for certain parameter 
constellations) be optimal to lift the moral hazard constraint for some of these types.
18   
 
Hence, the introduction of an optimal insurance arrangement may result in a fall in aggregate 
labor supply in models with both a continuous and a binary treatment of the individual’s 
health status. However, in the latter type of model, this can occur only if it includes ex ante 
different types of individuals in terms of the probability of becoming unable to work. 
Moreover, the mechanisms are fundamentally different in these two kinds of models. In a 
model with a continuous treatment of the individual’s willingness and ability to work, people 
will adjust their behavior to the implicit tax wedges of the insurance system, in the sense that 
they will abstain from work more often than when there is no insurance. No such adjustments 
take place in binary models, since people are either fully able or wholly unable to work. In 
such models, labor supply will not be affected unless the authorities remove the moral hazard 
constraint for some types of individuals, hence allowing such types to stay home regardless of 
whether they are able to work or not. Thus, while in binary models with heterogeneous 
individuals, income insurance implies that certain groups of individuals may withdraw 
completely from the labor market, in our continuous model the incentives to supply labor are 
reduced for everyone 
19 We believe that such a “gradual” treatment of individuals’ 
willingness and ability to work, and hence a gradual adjustment of labor supply to income 
insurance, is much more realistic than the notion that the insurer lifts the moral hazard 
constraint for some particular ex ante type of individual, who then drops out of the labor 
arket entirely. 
                                                
m
 
18 In a continuous-time version of their model, where each age group is regarded as a separate ” type”, Diamond 
and Mirrlees reached a similar conclusion as Whinston. If the probability of becoming unable to work increases 
by age, an optimal insurance policy in a continuous-time model with a binary health variable may be to abolish 
the moral hazard constraint for all individuals above a certain age. As pointed out by Diamond and Mirrlees, this 
is equivalent to introducing a pension system that permits both unhealthy and healthy elderly to live on benefits.  
19 A more technical way of stating the difference between the models is to point out that the consequences for 
aggregate labor supply can occur in the binary model only if we assume ex ante different types. In our 
continuous model, it is sufficient that individuals are different ex post as a result of different realizations of the 
stochastic parameter θ .   15
 
Let us end this section with a geometrical representation of the optimum insurance contr
under non-observability. By differentiating (2) with respect to p and b, taking (13) into 
account, and ma
act 























.     (16) 
ent 
 
Although it looks similar to (12) (with  F θ ˆ  replaced by 
∗ θ ), equation (16) describes a differ
function in the (p, b) plane than (12) since 
∗ θ  is endogenous. Since the marginal utility of 
consumption is always positive, the indifference curve is again upward-sloping in the (p, b) 
plane for all  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ π .
20 While the slope of the indifference curve is thus unambiguous, its 
curvature is not. Indeed, the indifference curves may have both concave and convex segments 
lthough we have chosen to depict a well-behaved, convex curve in Figure 3).
21 
(Figure  3) 






















Rather than a straight line as in Figure 2, the budget constraint (17) forms a non-linear curve 
in the (p, b) plane. Such a curve necessarily passes through the origin (p = 0, b = 0), since t
 trivially satisfies (17). It can be shown that for a wide class of distribution functions 
) (θ F , the budget constraint (17) generates a well-behaved “Laffer-type” curve in the (p, b) 
lane; see Figure 3. For this class of distribution functions, we can state 




20 This also holds for the case of a non-separable utility function. 
21 This property contrasts with the strict convexity of the indifference curves in the full-information case (12). 
The observation that indifference curves in insurance models may contain both concave and convex segments 
has been made earlier in a different analytical framework; cf. Stiglitz (1983) and Arnott (1992).   16
Proposition 5: For all distributions for which  )) ( 1 /( ) ( θ θ F F −  is convex in θ , the insurer’s 
le-peaked curve in the (p
hus, 
for a given b, the e
 that  is an increasing, convex function of p 
it 
 the 
r of other distributions, such as the 
ormal, log-normal, Weibull etc. distributions.
22 Thus the zero-profit constraint normally 
he slope of the Laffer curve, obtained by differen 17), is:
24
 
budget constraint under non-observability is a sing , b) plane. 
 
Proof: Expression (17) can be written in the form  p F F b = − ⋅
∗ ∗ )) ( 1 /( ) ( θ θ . The right-hand 
side of this equation is a linear, positively sloped function of p. If the left-hand side is a 
convex, positively sloped function of p, the two functions can intersect at most twice. T
quation can have at most two roots p. A sufficient condition for this to hold 
 
∗ θ (which obviously is the case) and that  is
)) ( 1 /( ) (
∗ ∗ − θ θ F F  is an increasing, convex function of 
∗ θ .   Q. E. D. 
 
Is it then reasonable to assume that  )) ( 1 /( ) (
∗ ∗ − θ θ F F  is convex? In fact, this ratio, which in 
the statistical literature is often called the odds function (the logarithm of which is the log
function), is convex for a wide class of distributions. It is easy to show this analytically for
rectangular distribution, and numerically for a numbe
n
forms a well-behaved Laffer curve as in Figure 3.
23  
 









In the case of an interior solution,  ) , ( N N b p  is a tan
)( ( '
) )( 1 ( ' ) (
p b u
b p p u f b db + − −
=
∗ θ
.     (18) 
gency point like N in Figure 3 (where we 
ave depicted the indifference curves as convex). Since less than full insurance is optimal, 
                                                
h
point N is located beneath the full insurance line.  
 
 
22 It does not, however, hold for all distributions. An example where it does not hold is Student’s t distribution 
with less than one “degree of freedom”, i.e., with thick tails and an infinite mean. 
23 In the case of a distribution function  ) (θ F  where the support has a limited domain (for instance, with a 
rectangular distribution), the Laffer curve intersects the horizontal axes at a finite value of p > 0, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. In the case of an unlimited domain (for instance, with the normal distribution), the curve instead 
approaches the horizontal axes asymptotically. 
24 It is easy to show that if we start at the origin and move to the right along the Laffer curve, the absence rate 
N π  increases.   17
As emphasized earlier, the equilibrium point is incentive compatible: confronted with the 
insurance policy ( , ) NN p b , the individual has no reason to pretend that his realization θ  is 
different from its tru lue. If there is no administrative rejection of claims, an incent
compatible insurance contract means that the individual himself can choose whether to live o
work or on benefits. This may seem to be quite an odd case, but it is a logical consequence of 
the assumption that 
e va ive-
n 
θ  is unobservable for the insurer. Indeed, until recently, in some 
countries sick-pay insurance has functioned in approximately this way, since the authorities 
ave been reluctant to reject individual claims. However, the analysis becomes more realistic 
 we assume that the insurer will, in fact, reject some benefit claims. We now turn to this 
ervability with Administrative Rejection 
ith administrative rejection of claims, the insurance contract would be characterized by a 
f 
, it 
rance contract for those whose claims are accepted. 
o analyze this issue, we assume that an individual whose claim has been rejected can choose 
either to continue working or to stay home without receiving benefits. The individual is thus 
nfronted with the following situation: 
 
  









quadruplet ) , ˆ , , ( q b p
∗ =θ θ , rather than the triplet  ) ˆ , , (
∗ =θ θ b p , where q is the probability o
rejection.
25 Can such a contract, with 0 < q < 1, constitute a welfare improvement?  
 
If the insurer cannot observe θ, rejection of claims has to be purely random. At first glace
may seem impossible that welfare (expected utility) could increase if such randomness is 
introduced, since a new type of income risk would then emerge. However, on further 
reflection, the issue turns out to be rather complicated. The reason is that administrative 






max (0), (1 ) ) . ,
u b with prob
u u p with prob q θ
∗ − ⎧ ⎪ ≤
−+
 
:( 1 ) .
)
:









25 Such lotteries have been extensively discussed in the literature on mechanism design; we return to that issue in 
Section 6.   18
where the insurer’s cut-off must be incentive-compatible:  ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ p u b u − − = =
∗ θ θ . 
Individuals with a realization 
∗ >θ θ  wil ut instead go to work. By 
contrast, all individuals with a realization 
∗ ≤θ θ  will apply for benefits, and they will have to 
participate in a kind of l
l not apply fo
otter e the probability of winning is 1 – 
tility u(b); otherwise th
r benefits, b
q. If lucky, they enjoy  y wher
ey enjoy utility  { } ) ) 1 ( ), 0 ( max θ + − p . Total absence now c u u u onsists 
f those whose claims were accepted plus t y h
laims were rejected:   
here  is the cut-off at which the individual is indifferent between staying home with no 
ction, the individual can return to work, a positive q will increase 
tility for certain parameter constellations.
26  
o hose who chose to sta ome even though their 
c
 
 ) 1 ( − = π q ,     (19) 
 
( ) ( )
∗∗ ∗ ⋅ + ⋅ θ θ F q F
 
∗ ∗ θ w
benefits and working:  ) 1 ( ) 0 ( p u u − − ≡
∗∗ θ . The welfare consequences of such insurance 
arrangements may be expressed as follows. 
 
Proposition 6: If, after a reje
expected u
 
Proof: See Appendix 5. 
 
Naturally the introduction of a rejection rate q has different welfare consequences for different 
realizations of θ  and different outcomes of the “lottery”. However, the consequences also 
depend on the adjustments of p and b made by the insurer to maintain a balanced budget. 
Clearly, those with a bad realization of θ  and a bad outcome in the lottery are losers. The 
gainers are either those who have chosen to work (provided there will be a reduction in p), or 
fits (provided there will be an increase in b). 
odel 
with consta
                                                
those who have applied for, and received, bene
Due to these complications, the net effect on expected utility cannot, in general, be signed 
analytically. 
 
Owing to the ambiguous analytical consequences for expected utility, we simulated the m
numerically. For this purpose, we assumed a utility function  nt relative risk 
 
26 An alternative assumption could be that the individual, after a rejection of his claim, is not able to return to 
work and thus has to be satisfied with utility u(0). It is easy to show that in such a case, the introduction of a 
positive rejection rate cannot increase expected utility. We consider such a setup as less realistic than the one 
where the individual can return to work.   19
aversion  we  s  , i.e.,  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) (
1 γ
γ − − =
− x x u . For u(0) to be defined, introduced an exogenou
non-wage income, k; this also has the advantage that we can study the consequences of 
variations in non-wage income. Consumption utility then is  1 ( p u ) k + −  when working, 
absent without 
For 
) k  when absent from work and receiving benefits, and  ) (k u  when (b u +
enefits. 
 
a normal distribution  ~ ) , ( σ θ m N
e chose t





4 = γ ,  0 = m simulations are reported in Figure 4. W , and 
2 = σ , but the res r a large set of




ism tends to make the relation between k and q negative. The net 
ffect of these counteracting forces is rather complex. Somewhat surprisingly, in all our 
e 
dditional policy instrument. On the other hand, the specific policy tool q is in 
onflict with the basic purpose of insurance, since it introduces a new type of income risk for 
e individual. It is therefore not surprising that the consequences for expected utility are 
 
                                                
ults are qualitatively similar fo  values.  
 
 (Figure  4) 
 
O
positive random rejection rate is optimal. By “plausible” we mean values that are of an orde
of magnitude similar to those observed in the real world.
27  
 
In this context, how is the optimal rejection rate related to the level of non-labor income k?
Intuitively, the optimal q might be expected to rise with k, since a relatively large k makes 
rejection of claims less harmful for the individual. However, a large k also means that the
individual has less need for the higher b that could be financed as a result of introducing a 
rejection rate; this mechan
e
simulations, the parameter configurations used in Figure 4 give rise to a monotone negativ
relation between k and q. 
 
Summing up, the introduction of random administrative rejection into the model has two 
counteracting consequences for expected utility. On one hand, it is advantageous to have 






27 For the simulations in Figure 4, the absence rate  q π  varies between 0.2 and 0.25. This is a realistic figure for 
many European countries, considering that it includes both sick-pay insurance and disability pensions.   20
6.  Partial Observability With Administrative Rejection 
 
So far, we have dealt with the polar cases when θ is either fully observable or wholly non-
observable for the insurer. The m istic assumpt on is that θ is imperfectly observab
We model this case by assuming that an outsider (the insurer and/or a legal authority) can
observe only a distorted signal 
ost real i le. 
 
ε θ + ≡ s  rather than θ  itself. For simplicity, we further 
assume that the stochastic variable ε  is independent of θ, and that it has the cum
distribution function  ) (
ulative 
ε G . Clearly, this case nests the two special cases discussed earlier, 
ince a distribution with var( 0 ) = ε  implies full observability (Section 3), while  ∞ → ) var(ε   s
implies non-observability (Sections 4-5). 
 
While rejection has to be completely random in the case of non-observability, the 
ate conditional on the observed signal s when 
insurer can 
make the rejection r θ  is partially observab
s for sick-leave benefi
le. 
As before, the individual applie ts iff  , where, again, 
. The insurer proclaims a cut-off
∗ ≤θ θ
) 1 ( ) ( p u b u − − ≡
∗ θ   ˆ θ  and accepts the benefit claim iff 
ility of rejection then is  θ ˆ ≤ . The probab s
 
 ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 1 ) ˆ Pr( ) ˆ Pr( θ θ θ θ θ θ ε θ − ≡ − − ≡ − > ≡ > ≡ q G s q . (20) 
 
Thus, q now becomes endogenous and a function of θ . Since all distribution functions are 
non-decreasing, it follows that q is also a non-decreasing function of the true θ:  /∂ ∂ 0 ≥ θ q
This proper
. 
ty has an intuitive appeal; the claim of an individual with severe health problems 
.e., a very low θ) is less likely to be rejected than a claim from someone who is more 
ith partial observability, the insurance contract may be written 






)) ˆ ( , ˆ , , ( θ θ θ − = q q b p .  W
 
() ˆˆ 1( )( ) ( ) ( ) p qf d q f
θθ
π θθ θθ θθ θθ
∗∗ ∗
−∞ −∞
=− − + − ∫∫      (21) 
                                                 
28 This property is consistent with Diamond’s and Sheshinski’s (1995) assumption that the probability of 
rejection of a claim for disability pension (which is higher than the early retirement pension) is an increasing 
function of the individual’s true health status.   21
 
where, as before,  ) 1 ( ) 0 ( p u u − − ≡
∗∗ θ .  
 
An important distinction between a constant rejection rate q (independent of θ ), as discussed 
in Section 5, and an endogenous one is that the distribution of absence across individuals wil
differ. Since an endogenous q implies that individuals with very low realizations of θ ar




g claimants than if q were exogenous. This also means that the income 
istribution will be more favorable for individuals with a relatively unfavorable outcome of 
therefore, ag  a numerical simulation with the same utility and distribution 
nctions as in Figure 4, but now with q defined by the function (20), with the disturbance 
d
the θ variable.  
 
As in the case of a constant q, we are not able to determine analytically whether the 
introduction of a rejection rate is desirable or not (see the Lagrangean in Appendix 4). We 
ain, carried out
fu
) 2 , 0 ( ~ N ε ; see Figure 5. 
 
 (Figure  5) 
 
As in the case with an exogenous q (Figure 4), it is easy to find parameter conf
lues of p and b. For most values of the non-wage income k, we also get 
values of the insurer’s cut-off point  ˆ
igurations that 
yield realistic va
θ  that yield an endogenous rejection rate 
ˆ () 0 q θθ =− > . Since a higher q   ˆ θ  imp
q, illustra  Figure 4. (With a normal distribution for the disturbance 
lies a lower rejection rate, q falls with k, just as in the 
case of an exogenous  ted in
ε  , the rejection rate   as  ). We may note that  0 q → ˆ θ →∞ θ
∗ may be smaller or larger than 
ˆ θ , depending on k. 
 
Exogenous and endogenous rejection of benefit claims may be regarded as two alternativ
types of “lotteries” among individuals who claim benefits. We could think of more e aborate
lotteries. For instance, the lottery ma  not only determine whether the individual should 





probability   with probability  , etc. Although such elaborate lotteries ma 1 q ,  2 b 2 q y be worth   22
further examination, we confine our discussion to the simple case of only two outcomes: 
either rejection or approval of the claims.
29 In fact, this simple type of lottery seems to reflect 




 is partially observable, and some claims are rejected on the basis of imperfect 
ignals.  




ce absence from work during 
eriods when work is associated with severe discomfort. 
 
The variant of our model discussed in this section, with partial observability and an 
endogenous rejection rate, is much more realistic than the cases of full observability and non






We have emphasized that income insurance in our analytical framework not only provide
income smoothing, but also relief from work when it would be particularly burdensome. 
These advantages come at a cost in the form of two disincentive problems. One is a d
consequence of the unavoidable tax wedge, which emerge regardless of whether the 
individual’s willingness and ability to work are observable or not for the insurer. Indeed
reduction in labor supply is part of the purpose of income insurance in our framework, 
namely to make it more feasible for the individual to finan
p
 
The other form of a disincentive effect on work is moral hazard. Clearly, there is no moral 
hazard problem at all in the case of full observability. Although there is such a problem if θ  is 
l 
observability. With non-observability, the insurer has to offer an incentive-compatible 
                                                
not fully observable, it takes different forms in the cases of non-observability and partia
 
29 Presumably, the more elaborate the lottery, the more problematic it may be from the point of view of 
legitimacy. 
30 Prescott and Townsend (1984) have argued that quite another type of lottery is optimal in income insurance. 
More specifically, every individual who applies for benefits will receive them, but the applicant will be exposed 
to a lottery of whether he has to work or not. With probability ρ  he has to stay home, thereby enjoying utility 
, while with probability  ) (b u ) 1 ( ρ −  he has to work, although only receiving b, thus enjoying utility 
θ + ) (b u . A lottery of this type cannot, however, be implemented in the real world. In a competitive labor 
market without slavery-like contracts, an insurer can hardly force an individual with an “unlucky” outcome of 
the lottery to work at the remuneration b (that is below what he can obtain in the market, 1 – p), or to stay home 
without benefits. And even if slavery-like contracts were allowed, such contracts cannot be implemented in a 
modern economy, where the production process is complex (often with strong complementarities among 
individual workers), and where the possibilities for shirking are abundant.   23
contract   and the individual wants to work if the realization of  ) ˆ , , (
∗ = N N N N b p θ θ θ is greater 
than the cut-off . Clearly, with an optimal contract, the problem of 
moral hazard in the form of misrepresentation of 
) 1 ( N p u − − ) ( N N b u =
∗ θ
θ  is solved in this case.
31 However, the 
solution of the problem comes at a cost in the form of less than full income smoothing. Thus, 
such a contract is second-best in the special sense that a better contract could have been 
achieved if θ  had been observable. With a rejection rate q, the optimal contract 
 also precludes misrepresentation of  ) , ˆ q q q
∗ =θ θ , , ( b p q q θ (since  ˆ
qq θ θ
∗ = ). Although a positive 
rejection rate might increase expected utility, some “type 2 errors” (when eligible persons are 
denied benefits) are unavoidable.  
 
Under partial observability, with the contract  , the insurer’s cut-off 
 becomes an operative parameter, by contrast to the case of non-observability. The 
rejection rate  , given by equation (20), implies a better targeting of benefits than the 
exogenous rejection rate q  in the case of non-observability. As with non-observability, the tax 
wedge is   when the individual decides whether to claim benefits or not, while it is   
for an individual whose claim has been rejected. However, by contrast to the case of non-
observability, misrepresentation is not eliminated by the optimal contract. Everyone with a 
realization of 
)) ˆ ( θ θ − p , ˆ θ p , ( = p q q p , p b
p θ ˆ
) ˆ ( θ θ − p q
p p b p + p p
θ  such that   will apply for benefits, and a fraction   of 
individuals in the interval   will actually receive benefits, even though their true 
) ˆ (θ − p q 1
∗ ≤ p θ θ
∗ ≤ < p p θ θ θ ˆ
θ −
θ  is larger than the insurer’s cut-off  ˆ
p θ . This may be labeled “type 1 errors” in the sense 
that these individuals will receive benefits because they appear to be more sick than they 
actually are. Thus, there will be some moral hazard also with an optimal insurance contract, in 
the form of type 1 errors. There will also be “type 2 errors” since a fraction   of 
individuals with realizations   will be denied benefits although they are actually 
qualified.  
) ˆ ( θ θ − p q
p θ ˆ θ ≤
 
 
                                                 
31 In the literature, moral hazard is often defined as “hidden action”. In our model, the individual’s action, i.e., 
going to work or not, is perfectly observable by the insurer, while the realization of the individual’s state θ  may 
not be observable. Hence, since the connotation of moral hazard as “hidden action” is too narrow, we suggest 
defining ex post moral hazard as “hidden action or hidden state”.   24
8.  Social Norms 
 
So far, we have analyzed how traditional economic factors, such as prices (p and b) and 
rationing (administrative rejection) affect the utilization of income insurance. However, the 
functioning of such insurance also depends on social norms concerning the utilization of the 
benefit system. Our model turns out to be well suited for incorporating such considerations 
into the analysis. To clarify this issue in the simplest possible way,  we return to the basic 
model of non-observability (dropping the subscript “N”), without a rejection rate q.  
 
A simple way of incorporating social norms into our model is to add a “stigmatization 
variable” 0 ≥ φ  to the individual’s utility when he is absent from work:  ( )
a uu b φ ≡− . (We 
follow the formalization of the role of social norms for benefit dependency in Lindbeck, 
Nyberg and Weibull, 1999.
32) One possible specification of this variable is to regard the norm 
as a constant:  φ φ ≡ , i. e., as exogenous (for instance, inherited from the past). Another 
possibility is to treat norms as endogenous, with the strength of the norm depending on the 
number of individuals who live on benefits: when a large number of individuals are absent 
from work, absence is likely to be more legitimate than if only a few individuals are absent. 
Hence, when the norm is endogenous, we have  ) (π φ φ ≡  with  0 / < ∂ ∂π φ , where π  stands 
for the average absence rate in society.
  
 
The individual’s cut-off point in the presence of norms,  , is the value of 
n ∗ θ θ  for which 
φ θ − = + − ) ( ) 1 ( b u p u : 
 
        (22) 
,




− − − =
∗
∗ p u b u
n
 
where   is the same cut-off point as in a model without social norms (2). From (22) it 
follows that both exogenous and endogenous social norms reduce the cut-off point:  . 
Since the individual chooses to stay home whenever  , his absence rate with norms is 
∗ θ
∗ ∗ ≤θ θ
n
n ∗ ≤θ θ
                                                 
32 See Moffitt (1983) for an early analysis of stigmatization from living on welfare payments. Brock and Durlauf 
(2001) give a systematic discussion of alternative ways of specifying various types of social interaction among 
individuals, including the role of social norms.    25
) ( φ θ π − =
∗ F
n , hence lower than without norms. In the case of exogenous norms, with 
φ φ = , this expression yields the closed-form solution  
 
) ( φ θ π − =
∗ F
n
ex .       (23) 
 
In the case of endogenous norms, we instead have  ( ) ()
n
end F π θφ π
∗ =−. Since the average 
absence rate π  is the same as the absence rate 
n
end π of the representative individual, we may 
write 
 




end F π φ θ π − =
∗ .     (24) 
 
The right-hand side of (24) is increasing in 
n
end π  and may be non-linear. The equation may 
therefore have multiple solutions, as is often the case in models of social interaction. Hence 
there may be several alternative absence rates (for a given insurance system) in a society with 
endogenous social norms.  
 
We achieve a particularly simple analysis by looking at a linear version of the model, 
assuming that θ  is uniformly distributed on [ ] s s + − θ θ , . For the case of endogenous norms, 
we further assume the linear stigmatization function  , where  ( ) (1 )
n
end end φπ γ π ≡⋅−
n γ  is a 
positive constant. With these functional forms, we obtain the following simple expressions for 
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For   to be non-negative, we assume that 
n
end π 0 2 ≥ −γ s . Substituting the expression for π  




end π π , i.e., of the 


















     (26) 
  
We may summarize the properties of our linear model in the form of the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 7:   
(i)  The absence level is lower with than without norms.  
(ii)  Parameter changes in the insurance system (for instance, in p or b) will have the 
same effect on the aggregate absence rate in the case of exogenous norms as 
without norms.
33 
(iii)  Parameter changes in the insurance system (for instance, in p or b) will result in 
larger changes in aggregate absence in the case of endogenous norms than with 
exogenous norms or no norms at all. In other words, endogenous norms create a 
“social multiplier” as defined by Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003). 
 
Proof: These properties follow immediately from the previous analysis. 
 
In policy discussions, the consequences of tax wedges and moral hazard are often measured in 
terms of either monetary costs (in our notation  b ⋅ π ) or absence rates (π ). When measured 
by absence rates, one possibility is to look at the difference in absence rates with and without 
                                                 
33 This result relies on our simplifying assumption of  a rectangular distribution  ) (θ F . For an arbitrary 
distribution,    iff  x x
n
ex ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ / / π π ) ( ) (
∗ ∗ < − θ φ θ f f . A sufficient condition for this to hold is that both 
cut-offs   and   are located on the upward-sloping part of the density function 
n ∗ θ
∗ θ ) (θ f .   27
insurance. For instance, in the case of non-observability the cost in terms of absence rates of 
introducing optimal insurance is
34 
 
0 1 π π − ≡ N C .       ( 2 7 )  
 
Of course, such a measure could also be applied in the presence of norms:  . In 
the case of exogenous norms, we have by (25) that  
n n n C 0 1 π π − =
 




i.e., the cost (as defined here) is the same with and without norms. By contrast, it becomes 
different in the case of endogenous norms (by equation (26)): 
 











Thus, the cost of introducing insurance is the same with exogenous norms as with no norms.
36 
By contrast, the cost of introducing insurance is higher (due to the multiplier  ) 2 /( 2 γ − s s ) in 





9.  Concluding Remarks 
 
                                                 
34 An alternative quantification of the cost of insurance would use the absence rate under full observability as the 
benchmark:  F N C π π − ≡ 2 . While   reflects total behavioral adjustment due to the insurance arrangement, 
 reflects moral hazard as a result of non-observability. 
1 C
2 C

























0 , 0 . 
36 The intuitive reason is that with a rectangular distribution, exogenous norms have the same consequences for 
π  as for  0 π . 
37 As in the end of Section 7, we could also isolate the cost associated with the moral-hazard problem: 
F C π π − = 2 .   28
We have treated an individual’s ability and willingness to work as a continuous variable, 
rather than a binary variable as is usual in the literature on income insurance. What are then 
the gains from our continuous approach? Basically, there are three gains. First, we obtain a 
more realistic view of the purpose of income insurance. It is not only a question of income 
smoothing but also of pain avoidance. Insurance helps the individual to finance absence when 
work is particularly burdensome. Optimal insurance requires the best possible trade-off 
between income smoothing and pain relief on one hand, and a fall in average consumption on 
the other hand.  
 
Second, our broader view of the purpose of income insurance means that the conditions for 
insurance to be desirable turn out to be stricter than in the traditional theory. In addition to 
concavity, the desirability of insurance also depends on the relation between the distribution 
of the individual’s health shock and the loss in consumption utility tied to reduced labor 
supply. 
 
Third, our framework is conducive to the analysis of not only traditional incentives in income 
insurance (i.e., prices and incomes) but also the role of administrative rejection as well as the 
role of social norms. By treating an individual’s ability and willingness to work as a 
continuous variable, both these features can easily be integrated into the analysis. 
 
Other extensions also seem promising, although we have not pursued them in this paper. One 
is to consider whether part-time benefits should be allowed – a policy issue that has become 
increasingly important in recent years. Such a reform creates incentives for individuals to shift 
either from full-time benefits, or from full-time work, to part-time benefits. The net effect on 
total work absence would then be expected to depend on factors such as the distribution of the 
individual’s state of health, whether the insurer restores budget balance after the reform by 
changing the contribution rate or the benefit rate, etc. In such a framework, administrative 
rejection could take the form of granting part-time sickness absence for some individuals who 
apply for full-time benefits. 
 
Another extension could be to include the effects on production of so-called “presenteeism”, 
i.e., a situation when individuals go to work even when they have health problems that reduce   29
labor productivity at the workplace.
38 Finally, the model may be modified to address 
problems connected with ex ante moral hazard, i.e., behavioral adjustment by the individual 
before the random health shock has been realized (for instance, when the insured individual 
chooses a less prudent lifestyle). In our framework, ex ante moral hazard can be analyzed in
terms of induced changes in the probability distribution of the health
 
 shock. 
                                                
 
 
38 See, for instance, Chatterji and Tilley (2002).   30
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1 
 
To prove Lemma 1 by contradiction, we assume that at the optimum, there is a group of 
people who stay home from work although they do not receive any benefits. If such a group 
exists, there must be an interval ( )
∗∗ θ θ, ˆ
) p
, with  , where   is the cut-off specified in the 
contract and  ; see figure A1. 
∗∗ <θ θ ˆ θ ˆ
1 ( ) 0 ( u u − − ≡
∗∗ θ
 
  Figure  A1 
0 ∗∗ θ   θ ˆ 
  ) (θ f
θ  
  
With a realization  , the individual stays home and receives a benefit b. With a 
realization between   and  , the individual prefers to stay home even if he does not receive 
any benefit, while with a realization  , the individual chooses to work. The insurer’s 
budget constraint is  . The Lagrangean then is 
θ θ ˆ ≤
θ ˆ





∗∗) (θ ) F − ⋅ 1
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() [] b F p F
E p u F u F F b u F L
⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ +
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∗∗
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
) ˆ ( ) ( 1
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 ) 0 ( ) ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ (
θ θ λ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
 
 
and we obtain the first-order conditions with respect to p and b: 
 
  λ = ) ( ' b u  and  b u b u ⋅ = − λ ) 0 ( ) (.  
 
Hence, ) ( ' ) 0 ( ) ( b u b u b u ⋅ = −
) (⋅ u
, which is a contradiction of the assumption of a strictly concave 
utility function  . Thus, no optimal contract   exists such that  .
  Q. E. D. 
) ˆ , , ( F F F b p θ
∗∗ <θ θF ˆ  31
 
 
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Condition (i) is necessary, since if  ) 1 ( ) 0 ( u u upper − ≤ θ  no one will work in the absence of 
insurance. Thus no one will work in the presence of insurance, either, and therefore insurance 
cannot be financed. Similarly, Condition (ii) is necessary, since if  ) 1 ( ' u lower − ≥ θ  everybody 
will always work, and there is no need for insurance. To prove sufficiency, we note that, by 
definition, an interior solution   satisfies   F θ ˆ
 
upper F lower θ θ θ < < ˆ .     (A1) 
 
To prove that a solution to (9c) satisfying (i) and (ii) also must satisfy (A1), we write (9c) as 
( ) 0 ) ˆ ( 1 ' ˆ ) ˆ ( = − + ≡ θ θ θ φ F u . We have  ) 1 ( ' ) ( u lower lower + =θ θ φ  which, by (ii), is negative. We 
also have  ) 0 ( ) 1 ( u u upper ) 0 ( ' u ) ( upper upper − + > + = θ θ θ φ , where the inequality follows from 
concavity. Thus, by (i),  0 ) > upper (θ φ . The continuous and monotone function   must 
therefore have a zero in the open interval 
) ˆ (θ φ
) , ( upper lower θ θ .  Q. E. D. 
 
 
Appendix 3: Proof that  N N p b − <1 
 














) 1 ( '
) ˆ (
) ˆ ( 1
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.     (A1) 
 
Since the left-hand side is always positive, the minus sign on the right-hand side, together 
with the fact that we have assumed an interior solution, means that the second term on the 
right-hand side is negative. We have three possible cases: (i)  λ > − ) 1 ( ' p u       and    λ < ) ( ' b u ; 
(ii)  λ < − ) 1 ( ' p u    and    λ > ) ( ' b u ; (iii)  λ = − ) 1 ( ' p u    and    λ = ) ( ' b u . 
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Case (i) implies that  b p < − 1 , i.e., overfull insurance. Case (ii) implies that  , i.e., 
less than full insurance, while case (iii) implies 
b p > − 1
b p = − 1  , i.e., full insurance. We now prove 
by contradiction that only case (ii) can apply. 
 
Assume that case (i) applies. Then the right-hand sides of (14) and (15) are positive (recall 
that 0 = =ν μ ) which is inconsistent with the left-hand sides being negative. Thus overfull 
insurance cannot be optimal. Assume then that case (ii) applies. Then the right-hand sides of 
(14) and (15) are negative; no contradiction occurs in this case. Assume finally that case (iii) 
applies. Then the right-hand sides of (14) and (15) are zero, which is inconsistent with the 
left-hand sides being negative. Thus only less-than-full insurance can apply.  Q. E. D. 
 
Let us instead assume a general, non-separable utility function  ) , ( θ c u . Instead of cases (i)-
(iii) under equation (A1), we now obtain 
 
  ( ) λ θ θ θ < > − ˆ ) , 1 ( 1 p u E    and    λ > ) 0 , ( 1 b u  
 
as the only possible configuration. Thus at the optimum, the expected marginal utility of 
consumption should be lower when working than when living on benefits. If it had not been 





Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Condition (i) is necessary for the same reason as in the proof of Proposition 2. To prove that 
condition (ii) is sufficient, given that (i) is satisfied, we note that sufficiency means that 
0 , ) 1 ( ) 0 ( > ⇒ − < b p u u lower θ . We will show by contradiction that this holds. Assume 
) 1 ( ) 0 ( u u lower − < θ  and  . Since  0 = = b p 0 , ≥ ν μ  for such a corner solution, (14) and (15) c
be written  1 ( '
an 
0 ) ≥ −λ u   −u  and 0 ) 0 ( ' ≥ λ . But these two inequalities imply  1 ( ' u ) 0 ( ' ) u ≥ ,   33
which is a contradiction in the case of a strictly increasing, concave utility function.
 39
  Q. E. D. 
 
 
Appendix 5:Proof of Proposition 6 
 
With an exogenous q (Section 5), the Lagrangean  
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is maximized with respect to p, b and q. From the first-order conditions, it is not possible to 
determine whether the optimal q should be zero or positive. To further clarify the issue, we 
simulated the model numerically (Figure 4).  
 
With an endogenous q (Section 6), the Lagrangean is 
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where   is defined by equation (20). A maximization with respect to p, b and   yields 
three first-order conditions. Again, from these conditions, it is not possible to establish 
) ˆ ( θ θ − q θ ˆ
                                                 
39 With a non-separable utility function, the inequality corresponding to   becomes  ) 0 ( ' ) 1 ( ' u u ≥
) ) , 1 ( ( ) 0 , 0 ( 0 1 1
∗ > ≤ θ θ θ u E u . Whether this inequality is consistent with a concave utility function depends 
not only on the distribution of θ , as in the case of a separable utility function, but also on the cross derivative 
 (which may be positive or negative).  12 u  34
whether the optimal q is zero or positive. Therefore, the model was numerically simulated 
(Figure 5).  
   35
References 
Albanesi, Stefania and Christopher Sleet (2006): “Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private 
Information”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 73, No. 1, pp. 1-30. 
 
Arnott, Richard J. (1992): “Moral Hazard and Competitive Insurance Markets”, in G. Dionne 
(ed.), Contributions to Insurance Economics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston. 
 
Barmby, Tim, John G. Sessions and John Treble (1994): “Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and 
Shirking”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 96, No. 4, pp. 561-566. 
 
Brock, William A. and Steven N. Durlauf (2001): “Interactions-Based Models”, in Heckman, 
J.J. and E. Leamer (eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 5, Elsevier Science, New York. 
 
Brown, Sarah and John G. Sessions (1996): “The Economics of Absence: Theory and 
Evidence”, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 23-53. 
 
Chatterji, Monojit and Colin J. Tilley (2002): “Sickness, Absenteeism, Presenteeism, and Sick 
Pay”, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 54, pp. 669-687. 
 
Cochrane, Archie L. (1972): “The Measurement of Ill Health”, International Journal of 
Epidemiology, Vol. 1, pp. 89-92. 
 
Diamond, Peter A. and James A. Mirrlees (1978): “A Model of Social Insurance with 
Variable Retirement”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 295-336. 
 
Diamond, Peter A. and Eytan Sheshinski (1995): “Economic Aspects of Optimal Disability 
Benefits”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 1-23. 
 
Glaeser, Edward L., Bruce I. Sacerdote and José Scheinkman (2003): ”The Social Multiplier”, 
Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 345-353. 
 
Gosolov, Mikhail and Aleh Tsyvinski (2006): “Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A 
Case for Asset Testing”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114, No. 2, pp. 257-279. 
   36
Lindbeck, Assar, Lars Nyberg and Jörgen W. Weibull (1999): “Social Norms and Economic 
Incentives in the Welfare State”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 1, pp. 1-35. 
 
Lindbeck, Assar and Mats Persson (2006): “A Model of Income Insurance and Social 
Norms”, CESifo Working Paper No. 1675. 
 
Moffitt, Robert (1983), “An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma”, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 73, No. 5, pp. 1023-1035. 
 
Prescott, Edward C. and Robert M. Townsend (1984): “Pareto Optima and Competitive 
Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard” Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 21-
45. 
 
Rees, Ray (1989): “Uncertainty, Information and Insurance”, in J. D. Hey (ed.), Current 
Issues in Microeconomics, Macmillan, London. 
 
Rees, Ray, and Achim Wambach (2008): “The Microeconomics of Insurance”, Foundations 
and Trends in Microeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 1-2, pp. 1-163.  
 
Rothschild, Michael and Joseph Stiglitz (1976): “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 90, N0. 4, pp. 629-649. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1983): “Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral 
Hazard”, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 8, No. 26, pp. 4-33. 
 
Whinston, M. D. (1983): “Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and the Optimal Provision of 
Social Insurance”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 49-71. 
 
Wilson, Charles A. (1977): “A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information”, 
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp 167-207. 
 
Zweifel, Peter (2007): “The Theory of Social Health Insurance”, Foundations and Trends in 















) (θ f  
∗
0 θ   0 =
∗






   38


















line:  p b − =1 
    F 
Zero profit 
constraint 
p   39
















 SEMINAR PAPER SERIES 
 
The Series was initiated in 1971. For a complete list of Seminar Papers, please contact 
the Institute. 
 
2007     
     
751.  Jose Mauricio Prado, 
Jr. 
Government Policy in the Formal and Informal 
Sectors 
752.  Irasema Alonso and 
Jose Mauricio Prado, 
Jr. 
Ambiguity Aversion, the Equity Premium, and the 
Welfare Costs of Business Cycles 
753.  Martin Gonzales-Eiras 
and Jose Mauricio 
Prado, Jr. 
Determinants of Capital Intensive and R&D 
Intensive Foreign Direct Investment 
754.  Ritva Reinikka and 
Jakob Svensson 
Working for God? Evidence from a Change in 
Financing of not-for-profit Health Care Providers in 
Uganda 
     
2008     
     
755.  Assar Lindbeck  Prospects for the Welfare State 
756.  Assar Lindbeck and 
Mats Persson 
A Continuous Model for Income Insurance 
 
 
ISSN: 1653-610X  
Stockholm, 2008 
Institute for International Economic Studies 